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Abstract: 
Upon acquisition of legal personality a company enjoys certain attributes such 
as limited liability. While the separate legal personality of a company enables it 
to enjoy rights and assume obligations quite different from its members, the 
limited liability of shareholders refers to the fact that the company alone is 
liable for its debts. However, such privilege of limited liability may not always 
exist when the legal personality of a company is abused and used for 
illegitimate or unlawful purposes and other reasons. This article examines some 
of the grounds by which the corporate veil can be pierced under Ethiopian law 
and the role of courts in recognizing the doctrine. Based on the analysis of the 
relevant legislative provisions and some court cases, it is found that Ethiopian 
company law, though not sufficient, provides some clear grounds of piercing 
the corporate veil and certain possible grounds which may call for the 
application of the doctrine. It is also argued that Ethiopian courts should apply 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, through the purposive interpretation 
of the statutory provisions, if doing so produces equitable results and fairness. 
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_____________ 
Introduction 
The separate legal personality of a company renders it a juridical person distinct 
from its shareholders. The other attribute of a company is limited liability of 
share holders in which the company will alone be liable for the debts it incurs. 
That is, if the company becomes unable to pay its debts, the members of that 
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company will not have to contribute towards paying the company’s debts out of 
their private funds. 
The attribute of limited liability of a company is known as the corporate veil 
or shell, due to the protection it offers to the shareholders by protecting or 
keeping them from the reach of outsiders (creditors). However, such privilege of 
limited liability may not always exist when, inter alia, the legal personality of a 
company is abused and used for illegitimate or unlawful purposes. If it is shown 
that the legal personality has been abused and used to the detriment of third 
parties (creditors), the theory of legal personality will be disregarded and it is 
looked upon as a collection of persons instead of a collection of capital. 
Consequently, the individual member(s), director(s) and manager(s) will be held 
liable for the wrongs caused through the use of the legal entity. This process is 
known as piercing or lifting the corporate veil. 
Based on legislative analysis, interview, and case analysis, this article tries to 
explore some possible grounds by which the corporate veil can be pierced under 
Ethiopian law and the role of courts in recognizing and applying the doctrine. 
The first section of the article deals with the basic attributes of a company. The 
second section deals with the meaning and origin of the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil, followed by a discussion on the grounds for piercing the 
corporate veil in some foreign laws, both in the common and civil law legal 
systems. The fourth section explores some possible grounds of piercing the 
corporate veil under Ethiopian company law and the role of Ethiopian courts in 
this regard. Finally section five forwards conclusions. 
1. The Basic Attributes of a Company 
Gogna defines a company1 as “a voluntary association of persons formed to 
achieve some common objectives, having a separate legal entity, independent 
and separate from its members, with a perpetual succession and a common seal, 
and with capital divisible into transferable shares.”2 Although Ethiopian law 
does not expressly define a company, it is possible to understand what a 
                                           
1
 While the term ‘Company’ is used in the Ethiopian legal system, the term 
‘Corporation’ is commonly used in the common law legal system though it is broader 
in concept which includes public enterprises. Since the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil is of common law origin, the term corporation is seldom used in this 
article particularly in sections dealing about foreign laws and not to confuse it with the 
term company. However, the term company is exclusively used in the sections dealing 
with the legal and judicial recognition of the doctrine in Ethiopia. 
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company is through its major attributes, namely, separate legal personality and 
limited liability of shareholders\members.  
1.1. Separate legal personality 
When a company fulfils the requirements laid down for its formation, the law 
considers it as a person. That is, in the eyes of the law, it is a person capable of 
enjoying rights and assuming obligations quite different from the physical 
persons who brought it into existence or who may be its members at any given 
time.3 The rights and obligations of the individual members are not those of the 
company and vice versa.  
The decision of the House of Lords in the case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
Ltd [1897] which revised the decisions of the Higher Court and the Court of 
Appeal marks the beginning of the judicial acceptance of the company as a 
separate legal entity. The facts in Salomon V. a Salomon & Co. Ltd are given 
below (as stated in Stephen Griffin, Company law: fundamental principles).4 
The proprietor of a small but successful business, Mr. Salomon, formed a 
business as a limited company in accordance with the registration provisions 
contained within the Companies Act 1862. Section 6 of the Act provided that 
“seven or more persons together could form a business provided that it was 
associated for a lawful purpose.”5 
The seven subscribers to the Salomon & Co. Ltd were Mr. Salomon, his wife 
and their five children. The company, A Salomon & Co. Ltd, purchased Mr. 
Salomon’s business in a solvent state for a consideration to a value of 
approximately £39,000. Mr. Salomon received £20,000 a fully paid-up £1 
shares, an issue of debentures to the value of £10,0006. The remaining six 
members of Salomon’s family were each allotted a £1 share in the company.7  
Unfortunately, a Salomon & Co. Ltd did not prosper. Mr. Salomon’s 
debentures were transferred to Mr. Broderip in return for £5000; this amount 
was then pumped back to the company by Mr. Salomon. Despite further efforts 
on the part of Mr. Salomon to keep the company afloat, less than a year after its 
                                           
3 Seifu Teklemariam (1968), Piercing the corporate veil: its application to private 
limited companies and share companies in Ethiopia, Senior Thesis, Faculty of Law, 
Haile Selassie I University, (unpublished), p. 4.  
4 Griffin Stephen (2004), Company law: fundamental principles, (4th ed.), Pearson 
Longman, p. 6. 
5 Ibid, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (House of Lords). 
6 A debenture acknowledges a loan or other credit agreement between the company and 
its creditors and is normally secured against the assets of the company. In Salomon’s 
case the debenture was secured by means of a floating charge and took the remainder 
of the sale price in cash.  
7 Griffin Stephen, supra note 6, p. 6. 
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formation, the company fell into an insolvent state.8 The company could not 
meet Broderip’s debenture interest payments and, fearful that his investment 
would be lost, Broderip sought to realize his security (the floating charge) by 
appointing a receiver. The company, which had other creditors, was 
subsequently put into liquidation.9 The liquidation (resulting, ultimately in a sale 
of corporate assets) of the company’s assets realized sufficient funds to meet the 
company’s debt to Broderip but not the debts owed to the company’s other 
creditors who, unlike Brodrip, had no secured interest (debentures). 
In the High court (heard as Broderip v. Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 322), the 
liquidator admitted the validity of Broderip’s prior claim to be repaid from the 
company’s assets because he had priority as holder of a secured loan. 
Nevertheless, the liquidator counter-claimed that the company and, therefore, 
the company’s unsecured creditors were entitled to be reimbursed by Mr. 
Salomon personally.10 
The trial judge, Vaughan Williams J, agreed with this contention. Whilst 
admitting that upon its registration a company is a legal entity, distinct from its 
shareholders, the learned judge opined that A Salomon & Co. Ltd (the company) 
was no more than an agent of its principal, i.e. Mr. Salomon. As such, the 
principal was responsible for the debts of its agent. The basis for the agency 
argument was that a company was a mere alias of its founder and had not been 
formed in accordance with the true spirit of the 1862 companies Act. Vaughan 
Williams J believed that “the 1862 Act, in its requirement for ‘seven persons 
associated for a lawful purpose’ should be interpreted to mean seven persons 
with a bona fide intention of participating in a trading venture, and not, as in the 
present case, a company which, in reality, was akin to a one-man business.”11  
On appeal, the decision of Vaughan Williams J was upheld, although in the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion the correct analogy between the company and Mr. 
Salomon was that of trust relationship: the company held its property on trust 
for its beneficiary, Mr. Salomon. As such, the creditors of A Salomon & Co. Ltd 
were entitled to claim against Mr. Salomon through the company. As the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal recognized that A Salomon & Co. Ltd, in complying 
with the registration provisions of the 1862 Act, had been validly formed as a 
separate legal entity. However, the court did not recognize that the liability of A 
Salomon & Co. Ltd should be divorced from that of its founder, Mr. Salomon. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that in relation to the 
requirements of formation, the correct interpretation of the Companies Act 1862 
                                           
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid, p. 7. 
11 Ibid.  
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was that seven persons who become members of the company should participate 
in the venture, rather than having nominal and superficial interest.12 
Notwithstanding that the business had been profitable prior to its formation, 
Lindley LJ (the Appellate Court’s judge) was of the opinion that “the manner in 
which the company had been formed indicated that it had been created for an 
illegitimate purpose, that it was a device to defraud creditors and as such was 
therefore contrary to the terms of the Companies Act 1862” because it was not 
associated for lawful purpose. In the Court of Appeal’s opinion the company’s 
illegitimacy stemmed from the fact that it was in reality a one-man company.  
Lopes LJ Stated: 
If we were to permit it to succeed, we should be authorizing a perversion 
of the joint Stock Companies Act. We should give vitality to that which is 
a myth and a fiction… To legalize such a transaction will be a scandal.13 
The House of Lords revised the decision of the Court of Appeal which had held 
that a company could not be formed by one dominant character together with six 
other persons divorced of substantial interest in the business venture. According 
to the House, the statutory language of the Companies Act 1862 was clear. “A 
company could be formed provided it had at least seven members, irrespective 
of whether all seven members made a substantial contribution to the 
company.”14 
Although both the High Court and the Appellate Court recognized that A 
Salomon & Co. Ltd, having complied with the registration provisions of the 
1862 Act, was a corporate entity, they had not contemplated the fact that once 
formed the company could not be considered as anything other than an 
independent entity, totally separate and distinct from its founder, Mr. Salomon. 
The House of Lords’ interpretation of the separate legal identity of a company 
was, in respect of A Salomon & Co. Ltd, absolute. Lord Macnaughten stated 
thus: 
The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers 
to the memorandum; and though it may be that after formation the 
business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are 
managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in 
law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the 
subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent 
and in the manner provided by the act.15 
                                           
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. p. 8 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
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The House of Lords in considering the agency and trust arguments of the lower 
courts concluded that both were contradictory to the view that the company was 
a separate legal entity. The finding of the agency or trust relationship would 
have meant that Mr. Salomon would have been personally liable for the 
company’s debt. Lord Halsbury remarked “once the company is legally formed 
it must be treated like any other independent person with rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those who took part in the 
promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those 
rights and liabilities are”.16 It is this decision of the House of Lords that marked 
the beginning of the judicial acceptance of the company as a separate legal 
entity distinct from its members. 
Under Ethiopian Commercial Law, legal personality is acquired by fulfilling 
the various requirements of the Commercial Code of Ethiopia and upon 
publication in an official commercial Gazette.17 However, the publication 
requirement did not practically exist as there is no commercial Gazette and 
recently the new registration and licensing proclamation (Proclamation No. 
686/2010) has explicitly abrogated the requirement of publication.  
Once a company acquires legal personality, there are important consequences 
attached to it. These include the company’s name, nationality and place of 
residence, the right to possess and administer property, its right to enter into 
juridical acts in its name, sue and be sued, and the company’s perpetual 
existence. 
1.2. Limited liability of shareholders/ members 
Limited liability of share holders/members is another basic attribute of a 
company which makes it the chosen mode of business.  Since a company is a 
separate person with property interests, it will alone be liable for the debts it 
incurs. This means that, if the company becomes unable to pay its debts, the 
members of that company will not have to contribute towards paying the 
company’s debts out of their private funds. The shareholders are liable only to 
the extent of the amount they have paid, or have promised to pay, for their 
shares.18 Share prices need not necessarily be paid when they are first 
purchased. When some money is outstanding on shares, the company may issue 
                                           
16 Ibid, p. 9 
17 Commercial Code of Ethiopia, 1960, (Negarit Gazetta, Proclamation No. 166/1960, 
Year 19, No. 3), Articles 223, 323, 324. 
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a ‘call’ for the remainder to be paid, but it can never demand more than the full 
price due to the company for that share.19   
Hence, a company is responsible for its own actions and will be 
predominantly liable for its own debts and the company’s creditors cannot seek 
the satisfaction of their claims from the members even if the company’s funds 
(assets) are insufficient to pay its liabilities in full. Moreover, the personal 
creditors of shareholders have no right to the company's assets except to the 
extent of the debtor member’s share.20 However, it must be noted that the law 
does not prevent the companies from making the liability of its members 
unlimited through the express provisions in the articles of association.21 
The rule of limited liability has a general application. It applies to all 
companies regardless of the number of shareholders, the type of business, or 
even whether they have business operations at all or merely function as a 
shareholding parent within a corporate group.22 Share companies and private 
limited companies differ from other forms of business organizations in that the 
latter do not enjoy limited liability except those who are limited partners in 
limited partnerships.23 This attribute of a company has greatly facilitated the 
expansion of business, particularly in the risky ventures. This is because limited 
liability encourages greater risk-taking in the business community, so that new 
avenues of commerce are explored, and this enhances employment 
                                           
19 Ibid, p. 12. 
20 Chon E. J and  Simitis C. (1963) ‘Lifting the veil in the company laws of the 
European continent’,  International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
Cambridge University press, p.189. 
21 Bagrial Ashok K. (2007), Company Law, (12th revised ed.), New York: Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., p.34. This is particularly true in case of companies 
limited by guarantee where the shareholders agreed to guarantee the debts of the 
company to a certain extent beyond their contribution, in case the company becomes 
unable to meet its debts. This possibility is not also totally closed even under 
Ethiopian law. This is because there is no clear prohibition from making the liabilities 
of shareholders unlimited through their mutual agreement (for the benefit of third 
party creditors). However, in case of General Partnership, it is not possible to make 
the liabilities of partners limited by their article of association as the provision of the 
law is mandatory.    
22 Cheng Thomas K. (2010) ‘Form and substance of the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil’, Mississippi Law Journal, Vol. 80, No. 2, p. 510. 
23 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Arts. 255 (2), 280, 296.  
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opportunities, the nation’s economic and financial growth, stability and 
prosperity.24  
Since the liability of the shareholders (members) is limited to their 
contribution, the company’s creditors cannot extend their hands to the personal 
property of the shareholders. Hence, due to the protection it offers to 
shareholders, the attribute of limited liability of a company is known as the veil 
or shell of a company. This is because this attribute covers the shareholders in 
the corporate veil and keeps them from the reach of outsiders (creditors). The 
veil or shell is the corporate personality of the company.  
Although limited liability is an advantage for shareholders, it may, however, 
greatly affect the traditional debtor-creditor relationships. Limited liability can 
have negative effects on creditors in different ways. First, it opens opportunities 
for both express and tacit misrepresentation in transactions with creditors. 
Shareholders who employ the company’s name through which to contract with 
others may misrepresent the assets of the company and simply walk away if the 
business fails.25  Second, limited liability makes it possible and sometimes 
attractive to shift assets out of the company after a creditor has extended credit 
to the company.26 It would be easy for shareholders to distribute assets to 
themselves (particularly in case of one-man and family companies) while 
leaving the debts with their company in violation of creditors’ right. Or more 
subtly, shareholders or directors may undertake highly risky (volatile) 
investments or increase leverage in order to shift uncompensated risk onto the 
shoulders of creditors.27 
All of these opportunistic moves, however, would lose much of their appeal 
if shareholders did not have the shield of limited liability to protect their 
personal assets from the consequences of contractual default on the part of the 
company. This and other factors necessitate the application of the doctrine of 
lifting (piercing) the veil which involves disregarding the attribute of legal 
personality of a company and reaching to the shareholders and other persons 
involved in the management of a company who are protected by the veil.  
                                           
24 Jesse H. Choper, Jhon C. coffee and Robert Morris Jr. (1989), Cases and materials on 
corporations,(3rd ed.), case book series, (Canada: Little Brown and Company  Ltd.), 
p. 145 
25 Allen William T., Kraakman Reinier, and Subramanian (2007), Commentaries and 
cases on the law of business organizations, (2nd ed.), New York: Aspen publishers,  
p. 131 
26 Ibid, p. 132. 
27 Ibid.  
 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: ITS LEGAL AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION IN ETHIOPIA  85 
 
2. The Meaning and Origin of the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil 
The independent legal status of the corporate entity which constitutes ‘the 
corporate veil’ or ‘the shell of a company’, serves as a curtain between the 
company and its members and is regarded as a privilege for the shareholders as 
it protects them from the risk of unlimited liability for the debts of the 
company.28 However, this privilege of limited liability may not always exist for 
certain reasons including when the legal personality of a company is used for 
illegitimate or unlawful purposes. If it is shown that the legal personality has 
been abused and used to the detriment of third parties (creditors), the theory of 
distinct legal personality (i.e. the separate and distinct existence of the company 
from that of its members) is disregarded.29 Consequently, the individual 
members will be held liable for the wrongs caused through the use of the legal 
entity. Hence, when this is done by courts or sometimes by statute, it is said that 
the corporate entity is disregarded or the veil of a company is pierced.  
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has its origin in the common law 
legal system particularly in England.30 Originally, it was a reaction to a rigid 
stand of the House of Lords on a famous decision that is known for establishing 
the principle of distinct entity of the company. In the Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
Ltd case (as stated above) the House of Lords decided that a corporation is 
different from its share holders, stating that: “the company is at law a different 
person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; …. and it is not in 
law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as 
members liable, in any shape or form.”31 
Therefore, this decision established not only one of the most important 
principles of corporate personality that a company is a distinct entity apart from 
that of its shareholders, but it also led to the development of its exception, i.e. 
the doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’.32 After this case decision, the 
realization that the corporate personality could be used in a fraudulent manner 
                                           
28 Bagrial, supra note 21, p.35. 
29 Ottolenghi, S. (1990) ‘From Peeping behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring it 
Completely’, the Modern Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, Blackwell publishing, p.339. 
30 Bruck Kefyalew (2003), Lifting the Corporate Veil in Corporate Groups Under the 
Commercial Code of Ethiopia, Senior Thesis, Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa 
University, (unpublished), p.60. 
31 Griffin Stephen, supra note 4, p. 8. 
32 Such terms as “lifting the veil”, “breaching the wall of a company”, “dislodging the 
corporate veil” or “piercing the corporate veil” are all legal terms of arts used to 
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came into focus. Consequently, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil began 
to assume a certain shape and form and became recognized in different forms 
both in the common law and civil law legal systems.  
3. The Grounds of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Foreign 
Laws  
Certain conditions may justify lifting the limited liability protection accorded to 
the shareholders of a company.  However, a consistent guiding principle has not 
yet evolved to enable us to predict with any certainty as to when the courts will 
lift the veil of a company.33 It is still impossible to discern any broad principle 
of company law indicating the circumstances in which a court should lift the 
corporate veil. Rogers AJA describes the authorities for piercing the corporate 
veil as “incoherent and unprincipled” stating that: 
[t]here is no common, unifying principle, which underlies the occasional 
decision of the courts (mainly common law courts) to pierce the corporate 
veil. Although an ad hoc explanation may be offered by a court which so 
decides, there is no principled approach to be derived from the 
authorities.34 
The common law courts have repeatedly asserted that the doctrine of piercing is 
an equitable one and its application requires weighing the totality of the 
circumstances. Many countries apply a two-prong (tier) test to piercing the 
corporate veil. First, there must be such a unity of interest and ownership 
between the company and its owners that their separate personalities should 
cease to exist in reality.35 These factors include lack of substantive separation 
between the shareholders and the company, shareholder domination, and 
overlap of corporate personnel and management.36 Second, an adherence to 
separate corporate personality should create inequitable results (injustice). That 
is, an inequitable result should occur if the acts are treated as those of the 
company alone (a fairness requirement). 37 
Hence, the determination of a veil piercing requires the judge to ascertain 
facts such as the extent of overlap in corporate personnel, and the degree of 
                                           
33 Susan Barber, (ed.) (2001), Text book of Company Law, (3rd ed.), London: Old Bailey 
Press, p. 12. 
34 Rams Ian M. and Noakes David B. (2001) ‘Piercing the corporate veil in Australia’, 
Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol.19, p. 4. 
35 Backer Larry (2002), Comparative Corporate Law: United States, European Union, 
China and Japan, Cases and Materials, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press), p. 987. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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shareholder domination of the company, unity of interest and ownership, and 
these should be evaluated in light of the doctrine’s underlying values of good 
faith and fairness.38  Principally, whether the corporate entity should be set aside 
comes down to a question of good faith and honesty in the use of corporate 
privilege for legitimate ends.39 It is asserted that veil piercing is justified when 
the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, 
protect fraud, or defend crime.40 These statements suggest that the corporate veil 
doctrine requires good faith and fair use of the corporate entity. In relationships 
with creditors, this duty of good faith and fairness (as principles of truth and 
respect) are some of the substantive objectives of the legal order. 
In short, piercing the corporate veil doctrine is non-conclusive. With its 
reference to desirable values and its non-conclusiveness, the corporate veil 
doctrine exhibits the open-endedness of a standard. That is, there is no single 
uniform standard for deciding and justifying veil piercing. The courts make a 
determination based on notions of fundamental fairness and justice on a case-
by-case basis. However, there are, as discussed below, some grounds of piercing 
that are usually stated in English law and French law.  
3.1. Piercing the corporate veil in case of fraudulent abuse 
(fraud exception) 
Piercing the corporate veil may be justified when the formation and subsequent 
existence of a company constitutes a fraudulent abuse of the company.41 The 
fraud exception considers the formation of a company to be a sham or façade.42 
To justify this exception, a company must have been formed for an improper or 
illegitimate purpose. Ordinarily, the fraud exception will operate where the 
underlying motive for formation was to enable the company’s human 
constituent(s) to impugn a pre-existing obligation with a third party (i.e. to 
evade contractual obligations). In such cases the common law courts in England 
                                           
38 Cheng Thomas K., supra note 22, p. 509. 
39 Ibid, p. 508. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Griffin Stephen, supra note 4, p.14. 
42 Rams Ian M., supra note 34, p. 12. A company is said to be a Sham or façade if the 
company is formed or used as a “mask” to hide the real purpose of the company’s 
controller. A ‘sham’ is something that is intended to be mistaken for something else 
or that is not really what it purports to be. It is a spurious imitation, a counterfeit, a 
disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or true, but something made in imitation of 
something else or made to appear to be something which it is not. It is something 
which is false or deceptive. As noted above, a “fraud” exception is dependent upon a 
“sham” argument as the courts have held that no fraud can be perpetrated where the 
company is real and not a façade. 
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may recognize the existence of the corporate entity but may nevertheless pierce 
the corporate veil to prevent individuals involved in the illegitimate activity 
from escaping a liability that otherwise would have been enforceable had the 
individual(s) concerned not sought to hide behind the company’s separate legal 
status.43  Thus, the motive for which a company is formed is the most relevant in 
determining whether a corporate veil should be pierced to impose liability on the 
members of the company. 
An example of cases in which the veil of a company is pierced on the ground 
of fraud exception was the Gilford Motor Co. Ltd V. Horne [1933] Ch 935,44 
(Court of Appeal) in which Mr. Horne entered into a contract with Gilford 
Motor Co. Ltd by which he agreed to abide by a restrictive covenant which 
provided that should he leave Gilford’s employment (as he was a managing 
director of Gilford Motors Co.), he would not solicit their customers. Upon 
leaving Gilford’s employment, Horne (through nominees) formed a company 
(JM Horne & Co. Ltd, in which his wife and an employee were sole 
shareholders and directors).  He thus impliedly sought to escape the terms of a 
restrictive covenant. The court held that “the company was a ‘sham’, an alias of 
Horne, and as such an injunction was granted to enforce the covenant.” The 
restrictive covenant was enforced against both Horne and the company, that is, 
the company’s corporate existence was not denied although the company’s 
corporate veil was pierced to recognize Horne’s personal culpability for the 
breach of the restrictive covenant.45 In effect, Horne had established a company 
as a fraudulent device to escape the terms of a pre-existing contractual 
obligation entered into with the Gilford Motors Co. Ltd. These types of 
companies are regarded as a ‘sham’ or ‘façade’ used to mask the real situation 
and justifies veil piercing. 
3.2. Piercing the corporate veil to establish a single 
economic entity 
This ground of piercing applies if there is a unity of interest and ownership 
between the company and its owners that their separate personalities have 
ceased to exist in reality. 46 This occurs when there is lack of substantive 
separation between the shareholders and the company, and overlap of corporate 
personnel and management. Even though more than two separate companies are 
                                           
43 Griffin Stephen, supra note 4, p. 15. 
44 Sealy Len and Worthington Sarah (2008), Cases and Materials in Company Law, (8th 
ed.), London: Oxford University Press, p.62. 
45 Ibid. 
46 This clearly indicates that the mere use of a subsidiary does not necessarily subject a 
parent corporation for the liabilities of a subsidiary corporation. 
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established, the law will consider them as one and single economic entity if they 
are not operated as wholly separate entities, but instead combine their resources 
to achieve a common business purpose.47  
This ground of piercing the corporate veil grounds itself on two interrelated 
theories: the “alter ego”48 theory and “single enterprise theory”49 of piercing the 
                                           
47 The law in Texas regarding piercing the corporate veil, p. 6, available at 
<http://www.pdfcari.com/The-Law-in-Texas-Regarding-Piercing-the-Corporate-Veil-
Section-1-....html> Accessed: February 10, 2011). 
48  The ‘alter ego’ theory also called ‘another self’ theory permits a court to impose 
liability upon an individual shareholder, officer, director, or affiliate for the acts of a 
company. This theory may also be used to impose liability upon a parent company 
for the acts of a subsidiary company when the subsidiary is “organized or operated as 
a mere tool or business conduit.” A court will look at many factors to determine 
whether an alter ego relationship exists. When dealing with an individual and a 
company, the court will look at the total dealings of the company and the individual, 
including evidence of the degree to which company’s assets and individual property 
have been kept separate; the amount of financial interest, ownership, and control the 
individual has maintained over the company; whether the company has been used for 
personal purposes. In these cases the court will disregard their separate personality 
and consider them as a single entity working in a different form or shape. (See the 
law in Texas regarding piercing the corporate veil. Pages 1-5 cited above). 
49 The “single enterprise” theory of piercing the corporate veil is another interconnected 
theory to the theory of “alter ego” which is used to impose liability when businesses 
integrate their resources. In order to take advantage of the company’s form of limited 
liability, parties will often form several different business concerns under the belief 
that each formed entity will protect them from any and all personal liability of each 
business concern. Courts, however, apply the single business enterprise theory to 
pierce the corporate veil in situations where two or more companies are not operated 
as wholly separate entities, but instead combine their resources to achieve a common 
business purpose. When courts find that a single business enterprise exists, they will 
hold each company liable for the obligations of the other relating to the common 
business purpose to avoid an ‘inequitable outcome.’  The courts used a ‘single 
enterprise’ theory to pierce the corporate veil in order to reach the assets of a 
subsidiary’s parent company or to reach the assets of any other entity involved in the 
single business enterprise. Courts have listed several factors that are to be considered 
when determining whether a single business enterprise exists. These factors, though 
not cumulative and exhaustive, include having common employees, common 
shareholders, common officers, centralized accounting, payment of wages by one 
company to another company’s employees, services rendered by the employees of 
one company on behalf of another company, unclear allocations of profits and losses 
between companies, undocumented transfers of funds between companies etc. (see 
the law in Texas regarding piercing the corporate veil, pp. 6-8). Both the ‘alter ego’ 
and ‘single enterprise’ theories are inter-related as the purpose and effect of the two 
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corporate veil.  There are different situations by which the corporate veil is 
pierced based on this ground of a single economic entity. The first situation 
relates to the case of group of companies (parent-subsidiary or sister 
companies). In this case, courts may pierce the veil of a company to allow a 
group of companies to be regarded as one, if they are not, in reality, independent 
either in human or commercial terms.50 Piercing the corporate veil to establish a 
single economic entity removes the corporate veil of the subsidiary (subservient) 
company, merging that entity with the dominant entity (holding company), or 
merging sister companies thereby constituting a single economic entity. An 
economic entity may be deemed responsible for the activities of both the 
dominant and the subservient parties51or to the debts of sister companies.  
The illustrative (non-exhaustive) factors the courts should consider in this 
regard include common stock ownership between parent and subsidiary, 
common directors and officers between parent and subsidiary, parent’s 
financing of the subsidiary, parent’s payment of salaries and other expenses of 
subsidiary, parent’s use of subsidiary’s property as its own, and the extent to 
which directors and officers of subsidiary are acting independently or in the best 
interests of the parent.52  The presence of these factors verifies that the unity of 
interest is more complete and the exercise of control over the subsidiary is more 
intimate, thereby justifying veil piercing. 
The other situation by which the corporate veil is pierced on the ground of 
establishing an economic entity is the case of one-man company. One-man 
companies face a great threat of having their legal personality disregarded. This 
is because there is abundant chance for the mingling (mixing) of personal and 
company assets and for the complete control (domination) of company’s 
policy.53 A mere proof that one man owns all the shares of a company cannot 
destroy its separate entity unless the following circumstances occur. First, the 
company must be influenced and governed by the sole owner and a unity of 
interest and ownership ought to exist in such a manner that the individuality or 
separateness of the said person and company has ceased.54 Second, the facts 
should show that an adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the 
                                                                                                            
theories is identical: to allow a plaintiff to recover from another party when a 
company does not have adequate assets. 
50 Keenan Denies (2009), Smith & Keenan’s Company law, (12th ed.), Pearson 
Longman, Book aid international, p. 26 
51 Griffin Stephen, supra note 4, p. 16. 
52 The law in Texas regarding piercing the corporate veil, supra note 47, p. 3. 
53 Wormser I. Maurice (1912), ‘Piercing the veil of corporate entity’, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 6, Columbia law review association Inc.,  p. 504. 
54 E. O. E. (1925) ‘Corporations: Disregarding Corporate Entity: One Man Company’, 
California Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, California law review Inc., p.238. 
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company would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice.55 That is, the facts set forth should disclose that the dealings were in 
form with a company but in reality with an individual, and that a refusal to 
recognize this fact will bring about inequitable results. Third, the company must 
be the corporate double (alter ego) of the sole shareholder.56 In other words, the 
shareholder must have confused (mixed) the company’s business with his other 
affairs and an application of the conception of separate personality of the 
company must lead to injustice. 
In other words, where a company is the instrumentality through which an 
individual (who is the sole shareholder transacts his business), the company will 
be bound by the acts of the sole shareholder just as he would be bound if the 
company did not exist. Where the sole shareholder does not distinguish between 
the company’s business and his individual affairs, there is no reason for the 
court to make this distinction.57 
Generally, to pierce the corporate veil either in parent-subsidiary companies 
or in a one-man company on the ground of establishing a single economic 
entity, the courts must consider the extent to which the financial affairs and 
accounts of a company and those who control it are confused (mingled) to the 
prejudice of creditors, the undue diversion of its funds to individual use, and the 
holding out of a subsidiary as a mere department, branch or part of the system.58 
However, the above factors are stated in general terms and the courts are given 
discretion to appraise a particular situation in each case.  
3.3. Piercing the corporate veil on the ground of agency 
Where the company is acting as an agent of the shareholders, then the latter will 
be held liable for its acts. There may be an express agreement59 to this effect or 
such agreement may be implied from the facts of a particular case though there 
is no express agency agreement.60 In other words, the concept of agency has 
sometimes been used by the courts under which the subsidiary is regarded as an 
agent61 of its holding company (sole owner in case of one-man company), even 
                                           
55 Ibid, p.239. 
56 Ibid.   
57 Ibid, p.237. 
58 Seifu Tekle Mariam, supra note 3, p.13. 
59 Gulshan S.S and Kapoor G.K. (1991), Company law: Including MRTP Act, FERA 
and Interpretation of Statutes, (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited), p. 5. 
60 Keenan Denies, supra note 50, p. 27. 
61 In the context of an agency relationship between corporate entities, agency may be 
tentatively defined as a relationship which is based upon the express or implied 
consent of both the subsidiary company and its holding company (sole owner in case 
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though there is no agency agreement as such between them in regard to the 
transaction concerned. The effect is that the transactions entered into by a 
subsidiary are regarded as those of the holding company (sole owner in case of 
one-man company) for which the latter is liable. 
Although an agency relationship may establish the existence of an economic 
entity, it must be noted that in terms of pure theory, an agency relationship 
creates no disturbance to the subsidiary’s corporate veil because to establish an 
agency relationship one must have a principal and an agent, that is two distinct 
legal entities.62 Therefore, as a legal concept, agency is not a device which 
pierces a corporate veil, albeit, notwithstanding the theory, the finding of agency 
relationship between two distinct entities will result in the same effect as if the 
corporate veil had been lifted, namely the principal (the holding company or a 
sole owner in case of one-man company) will be liable for the actions of its 
agent (the subsidiary company or one man-company).63  It seems, therefore, that 
agency relationships are established by the courts with the sole aim of finding 
the principal responsible for the acts of his 'agent'. The basis for their judgment 
is that the principal has made his agent act according to specific instructions, 
thus depriving 'the agent' of any willpower of its own.64 This technique of 
imposing an agency relationship is used by the common law courts when they 
are reluctant to lift (or pierce) the veil completely (referred to as real lifting of 
the veil), but achieve the same result as that of piercing the veil. 
This ground of piercing the corporate veil is mainly implemented for 
purposes of liability to tax.65 If the purpose for which a company is established 
is for tax-evasion or circumvention of tax obligation, the court may not 
recognize the separate legal existence of the company. 
The foregoing discussion shows that the common law courts have used 
elastic and flexible terms such as “equity, fraud, single economic entity, agency 
or instrumentality” as grounds to pierce the corporate veil and to reach to those 
persons who have used the corporate device for various improper purposes and 
                                                                                                            
of one-man company), whereby the subsidiary company is made subject to the 
holding company’s control and will and to the extent that the subsidiary conducts its 
business affairs for the ultimate benefit of the holding company (sole owner). 
Therefore, to establish agency in group relationship, it is crucial to prove that one 
dominant company (sole owner) exerts absolute control over the affairs or acts of the 
other company.( see also Griffen Stephen, company law: fundamental principles, 
p.21, cited above). 
62 Griffin Stephen, supra note 4, p.21. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ottolenghi S., supra note 29, p. 346. 
65 Gulshan, supra note 59, p. 4. 
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to grant justice (remedy) for those wronged. Although the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil has its origin in the common law legal system, it has 
influenced the civil law legal system at large. The French legal system66 
provides some statutory provisions and judicial grounds by which the corporate 
veil may be pierced. One of the statutory grounds of piercing the veil in French 
law is in case of bankruptcy. Under French law, shareholders or persons who 
have acted as managers and any person who has used the company’s property as 
his/her own and benefited therof shall be liable for the debts of the company 
when its assets become insufficient to pay off creditors.67 
The reason for making the managers liable for the debts of a company is the 
presumption of the law that they have failed to be diligent and careful in 
managing the affairs of the company. However, the liability may not be imposed 
where the manager and the other administrators concerned prove that they have 
performed the obligations incumbent upon them in respect of the affairs of the 
company completely and with due diligence.68 However, absence of actual 
participation in management or supervision of the company, after assuming such 
a position, cannot be a defense to escape from liability.69 Hence, bankruptcy is 
the most important and frequent situation in which the French law pierces the 
corporate veil. 
The other situation of statutory piercing of the corporate veil in French laws 
is with respect to the controlling shareholder who owns more than half of the 
shares of a company, or controlling shareholders whose shares enable them to 
have the majority vote. French law attempts to pierce the corporate veil and 
make the controlling shareholder(s) liable for the debts of the company. The 
controlling shareholder could be a holding company or an individual 
shareholder. However, the mere fact that a person is the controlling shareholder 
of a company does not render him/her liable for the debts of the company. 
Where the controlling shareholder has acted properly within the limits of his/her 
legal rights, no such liability is incurred. This is particularly true where the 
                                           
66 The author surveyed some grounds of piercing the corporate veil in the French Law, 
despite its origin is in the common law, because our country, at least in principle, 
belongs to the civil law legal system and the French law has been the direct source of 
our Commercial Code of 1960. 
67 Lutter Marcus (1973), ‘Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies’, Vagts 
D., (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XIII, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, p.102 
68 Chon E., supra note 20, p. 206. 
69 Ibid, p. 208. 
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minority shareholders were able to exercise their own rights of opposition and 
supervision.70 
Piercing may apply where a parent or holding company fails to apply (in its 
dealings) the necessary distinction between its own assets and those of its 
subsidiary.71 It was consequently applied in a case in which a subsidiary had 
been established with capital from the holding company whose board habitually 
issued instructions to the board of the subsidiary on the management of the 
latter's affairs.  The dependence of the subsidiary on the parent company was 
furthermore underlined by the fact that the parent company used the subsidiary 
for the purpose of fraudulent transactions, including the concealment of assets 
owned by the parent company.72 
This statutory piercing is similar to the common law piercing on the ground 
of establishing a single economic entity. This fact is affirmed by the statutory 
provision of the French Commercial Code which states that “any capital held, 
even where this is less than 10%, by a controlled (subsidiary) company shall be 
regarded as being indirectly held by the company controlling the latter.”73  
Similarly, the controlling individual shareholder will be liable if he did not 
manage the company as if it was a separate entity, but treated it as a personal 
enterprise of his/her own. 
…[I]t has been held that a person who either directly or through a 
nominee owned the majority of the shares of a company was personally 
responsible for the debts of the company if he acted arbitrarily as maitre 
de l'affaire and treated the company's assets as if they were his own. Such 
a state was assumed to exist in a case in which, in fact, the participation of 
the other shareholders was found to be of no practical or economic 
importance, or where actual accounts were in fact not issued or where the 
board of management or the assembly of shareholders existed merely on 
paper and were in fact not convened or in cases in which the company 
effected sales without issuing and dispatching to its customers proper 
invoices, thus enabling the controlling shareholder to appropriate the cash 
resulting from the payment of the purchase price by the customer.74 
These are some of the situations by which the French legislator has provided 
statutory solutions to the issue of disregarding the corporate entity. There are 
also some non-statutory grounds of judicial piercing in France. Although the 
                                           
70 Ibid, p. 207. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, p. 297. 
73 The French Commercial Code: Commercial Companies and Economic interest 
Groups, updated 03/20/2006, compiled by Zekarias Keneaa, Art. L233-4. 
74 Chon E., supra note 20, p. 206 
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statutory provisions were mainly applied, French courts have in fairly few 
instances found it necessary to lift the corporate veil. One of the cases in which 
the corporate veil was lifted by French Courts relates to cases in which valid 
agreements in restraint of trade was concluded. An obligation validly entered, 
by which one party bound itself not to establish a competitive business in a 
defined area, cannot be evaded by the formation of a company which is 
intended to run a business in the interest of the promisor.75  This is similar to 
the common law case of Gilford Motors Co. Ltd v. Horne, stated above, in 
which Horne, through nominees, formed a company (JM Horne & Co. Ltd) 
through which he impliedly sought to escape the terms of a restrictive 
covenant. 
The other case by which the French courts pierce the corporate veil is in case 
of defacto companies (companies existing in fact without fulfilling the 
requirements of the law). This is particularly when a company fails to maintain 
the minimum membership requirements of a company. If the company members 
are reduced below the legal minimum, the remaining members of a company 
who are aware of the reduction of membership below the legal minimum will be 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of a company incurred six months after 
such reduction happens. This ground of piercing is applied by the courts for 
public limited companies and not for limited liability companies76, as limited 
liability companies can be operated even by one person.77 However, in case of 
public limited companies the number of members may not be less than seven.78 
Hence, if the number of members is below seven, the remaining members 
cognizant of the fact of such reduction will be jointly and severally liable for all 
the debts of a company incurred six months from the date of such reduction. 
Moreover, they cannot invoke the nullity of the company against third parties, 
but third parties may use the nullity against the shareholders, managers or 
directors. In case of bankruptcy, they may be directly declared bankrupt without 
                                           
75 Ibid, p. 210 
76 The French law recognizes two types of companies with separate legal existence and 
limited liability of the members. These are Limited Liability Company (LLC), which 
can be formed by one or more persons who shall be liable only in respect of their 
contributions and designated by the name, in which may be contained the names of 
one or more members and which must be immediately preceded or followed by the 
words “Societe A Responsabilite Limitee” or the initials “SARL; and Public Limited 
Company, a  company whose capital is divided into shares and which is formed 
among members who shall bear any losses only up to the amount of their 
contributions. It is also called Societe Anonyme (SA). 
77 The French Commercial Code, supra note 73, Art. L 223-1 
78 Ibid, Art. L 225-1  
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first going into the bankruptcy of the company as there is no company at law to 
be declared bankrupt and proceeded against.79 
4. The Statutory and Judicial Recognition of Piercing the 
Corporate veil in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian Commercial Code recognizes two types of companies: Private 
Limited Company80and Share Company. Share Companies can be formed in two 
ways.81 Both types of companies, after fulfilling the legal requirements, will 
acquire legal personality and the attribute of limited liability of shareholders 
(members). The Commercial Code vests legal personality, which is the most 
important attribute, on all types of business organizations except a joint 
venture.82 Due to its separate legal personality, a company is a subject of rights 
and obligations, in its own right, distinct and separate from its shareholders, 
directors and managers. It may therefore, enter into contracts not only with the 
                                           
79 Seifu Tekle Mariam, supra note 3, p.19 
80 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 510. A private limited company is a company 
consisting of two to fifty members who are liable only to the extent of their 
contribution. It is always commercial in form and governed by the Commercial Code 
provisions of Arts. 510- 543 and the general provisions applicable to all forms of 
business organizations (Arts. 210- 226). 
81 One way of forming a share company is formation as between founders without 
offering the shares for public subscription (Art. 316 of the Commercial Code of 
Ethiopia). These types of Companies are sometimes called closely held or Family 
Share Companies. In this case, the memorandum of association shall indicate the fact 
that all the shares  have been allocated, one quarter of the value of the shares have 
been deposited in a bank and the valuation of contribution made in kind, if any, has 
been made in accordance with the law and that the administrative organs of a 
company are established. The other way of formation of Share Companies is by 
offering shares for public subscription through a prospectus signed by all the 
founders (Arts. 317, 318 of the Commercial Code). The prospectus shall be made in 
such a way that it would help the offerors (subscribers) know the price of shares, time 
of payment, summary of the memorandum and articles of association. Artsicles 318-
322 will apply for such share companies which is not the case in closely held share 
companies. However, except for some provisions related to its formation, both types 
of share companies are subject to the same provisions of the Commercial Code (Arts. 
304- 509 and the general provisions applicable for all business organizations (Arts. 
210-226)).   
82 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 210 (2). The term ‘joint venture’ as used in the 
Commercial Code refers to Societe Annonymes, (yeashmur mahiber in the Amharic 
version).  It binds the parties in but lacks juridical personality in relationships with 
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world outside itself but also with its members, sue and be sued, has the right to 
possess property and capital by selling its shares, the power to compromise bona 
fide disputes etc.83 However, since a human agent is necessary to exercise those 
rights and respond to the duties, a company acquires rights, incurs liabilities and 
acts in legal proceedings only through its agents.84 
The other attribute of Ethiopian companies is limited liability of the 
shareholders (members). Art. 510(1) of the Commercial Code provides that “a 
private limited company is a Company whose members are liable only to the 
extent of their contributions.” Although the Commercial Code provides for the 
liability of members instead of first providing for corporate liability, it is 
obvious that the corporate liability of a private limited company is limited to its 
assets. Similarly, according to Article 304 of the Commercial Code the 
liabilities of a share company are limited to the total value of its assets.85  
Assets are the sum total of what a company owns.86 The total initial 
contribution from members (i.e. the sum total of the par value of all shares 
issued) constitutes the capital of a company, as enshrined under Articles 306 
and 512 of the Commercial Code. The amount contributed by shareholders in 
excess of the par value (face or nominal value) of the share is known as issue 
premium87and is not part of the capital but is still part of the assets of a 
company.88 The other components of the assets of a company, particularly a 
share company, are the various types of reserves created from the profits 
generated by the company itself. Reserves may take different forms, namely, 
legal reserve, supplementary reserve, optional reserve and free reserve 
depending on the source that created them.89 All these constitute assets of the 
company against which creditors may proceed for the satisfaction of their claims 
and no shareholder is personally liable so long as s/he has made her/his 
                                           
83 Seyoum Yohanness (2008) ‘On the Formation of Share Companies in Ethiopia’, 
Journal of Ethiopian Laws, Vol. 22, No.1, p.104  
84 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 216. 
85 Ibid, Art. 304(1).  
86 Seyoum Yohanness, supra note 83, p.106. 
87 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 326. Shares can be classified as share at 
discount and shares at premium based on the price at which shares are issued. Shares 
at discount are shares issued at a price lower than its par (face) value. However, 
under Ethiopian law share at discount are totally prohibited. On the other hand, 
premium shares are shares issued at a price greater than the par value where such 
issue is provided by the memorandum or article of association or decided by an 
extraordinary general meeting. The difference between the par value and the price at 
which the shares are issued shall be known as a premium.   
88 Seyoum Yohanness, supra note 83, p.106. 
89 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 453(2(d)). 
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promised contribution. That is, once the shareholder has paid the par value and 
any premium agreed, s/he is no longer liable to contribute anything further 
towards meeting the company’s debts and liabilities. 
The logical questions that follow are, therefore, is the legal personality of 
companies always respected under Ethiopian laws? Can shareholder(s), 
director(s) or manager(s) of a company do whatever they wish under the cover 
of limited liability and separate legal personality of the company? Is there no 
ground (room) for courts of law to look behind the wall of a company and make 
the human constituents liable?  The next sections of the article address these 
issues. 
4.1. Grounds for piercing the corporate veil in Ethiopia  
The Ethiopian Commercial Code provides certain remedies to the creditors of a 
company against persons who are really responsible for the prejudice caused. 
Some of these remedies are clearly provided and while others are potential 
statutory grounds of piercing the corporate veil. 
4.1.1. Piercing the corporate veil in case of bankruptcy 
One of the most serious attempts to safeguard the interest of corporate creditors 
is provided by the statutory obligations placed upon certain persons in respect of 
their potential personal liability for the debts and liabilities of the company, 
following the company’s slide into a state of bankruptcy. Articles 531 and 
1160(1) of the Ethiopian Commercial Code are the two most important legal 
provisions in this regard. 
With respect to Private Limited Companies, Article 531 of the Commercial 
Code renders persons who participated in the management of the company that 
has become bankrupt liable for the debts of the company unless they rebut the 
presumption of non-diligence by proving that “they have acted with due care 
and diligence.”  Article 531(1) provides that “if a private limited company 
becomes bankrupt and as a result the assets are shown to be inadequate, the 
court may order the managers or members or both to pay the whole or part of 
the company’s debts separately or jointly.” The terms ‘managers’ and 
‘members’ under this provision respectively refer to non-member managers and 
member managers; or members who have acted as managers (though not 
managers per se). This can be understood from the words of sub-art. (2) of the 
same provision which stipulates that “the liability shall not apply to members 
who have not acted as mangers” (non-manager members). Therefore, the 
application of Article 531 of the Commercial Code is restricted only to persons 
(be they members or non-members) who are managers or who acted as 
managers of a company. Thus, it is not possible to make all members of the 
private limited company per se liable during the event of its bankruptcy. 
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In short, as per Article 531 of the Commercial Code, piercing applies and 
manager(s) will be held liable when the company is declared bankrupt and the 
assets are inadequate to meet its debts. The logical question that may follow is, 
as to whether piercing can apply when the assets of a private limited company 
are shown to be inadequate though it is not declared bankrupt? That is, whether 
judicial bankruptcy is the requirement? One may logically argue that piercing 
can also apply in this case though the private limited company is not declared 
bankrupt. In other words, the term “bankruptcy” in Article 531 may not 
necessarily imply the declaration of bankruptcy but also insolvency (factual 
bankruptcy) as the legislator seems to have had in mind the falling short of 
assets of the company to meet its own debts instead of judicial bankruptcy. 
Generally, if the company becomes unable to meet its debt, the law takes a 
presumption that the manager(s) were not diligent or careful in their 
management. However, the presumption is rebuttable and hence such persons 
can escape from liability by proving that they have acted with due care and 
diligence.90  
Similarly, Article 1160(1) of the Commercial Code, which applies to both 
share and private limited companies, makes certain persons liable for the debts 
of the company if it becomes bankrupt.  Art. 1160(1) states that “Where a share 
company or private limited company is declared bankrupt, the adjudication may 
declare bankrupt any person who has carried out commercial operations on his 
own behalf and disposed of company funds as though they were his own and 
concealed his activities under the cover of such company.”91 
Therefore, if a share company or private limited company is declared 
bankrupt,92 creditors can require the bankruptcy of ‘any person’ who has carried 
out the operations in the manner stated in the provision.  Although Ethiopian 
law extends such liability to ‘any person’ subject to the fulfillment of the 
conditions stipulated by the law, it does not expressly indicate as to who these 
persons are.  
Under such situations, the Uniform Acts of the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) provide for personal 
bankruptcy of natural persons who are managers or representatives of body 
corporate whether they are de jure, de facto, remunerated or not, apparent or 
hidden.93 Ethiopian law has no clear provision indicating who these persons are, 
                                           
90 Ibid, Art. 531(2). 
91 Ibid, Art. 1160(1). 
92 Ibid, Art. 968. A company is said to be bankrupt, it must have suspended payments 
and declared bankrupt by the court of law as factual bankruptcy cannot be taken as a 
ground.  
93 The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), 
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and seems to extend the bankruptcy to ‘any person’ (irrespective of whether 
they are managers, directors or not).  Although as a matter of rule, bankruptcy 
applies only to traders and commercial business organizations94 under Ethiopian 
law, Art. 1160(1) seems an exception to this general rule.  Hence, the phrase 
“any person” in Article 1160(1) of the Commercial Code refers to “any person” 
(both natural and juristic), irrespective of whether they are managers, directors 
or not, regardless of whether they are traders or not so long as the conditions 
stipulated by law are fulfilled. 
Therefore, creditors can require the bankruptcy of any of such persons if a 
share or private limited company is declared bankrupt upon proof of the 
following three cumulative elements. First, only a person who has carried out 
commercial activities on his own behalf falls under Article 1160(1).  ‘On his 
own behalf’ means that the person carried out the business in his personal 
interest or benefit, or the person has some pecuniary or non-pecuniary interests 
directly or indirectly accruing to him.95 Though a director or a manager, while 
carrying out commercial operation, has a duty to act in the interest of the 
company in which s/he is a director or manager, it may not always be the case as 
the director or manager may run the affairs of the company to fulfill his/her own 
interest. Second, the person must have disposed of company funds as though 
they were his own. This means that a person treated the assets of the company as 
his own assets, or used the corporate assets or credit to his own interest at the 
expense of the company. Although it is not clear as to what the phrase 
‘company’s funds’ under Art. 1160 (1) refers to, it is logical to understand that it 
should not be limited to imply the company’s liquid money but rather it includes 
all properties constituting the company’s assets. Third, the person must have 
concealed his activities under the cover of such company. That is, a person must 
use the company as a mask to achieve his own purposes at the expense of the 
latter. Where these three cumulative elements are met, Article 1160(1) of the 
Commercial Code extends the company’s bankruptcy to any person, regardless 
of whether he/she has served as a manager or director of a company. 
It is to be noted that creditors of a bankrupt private limited company have a 
dual option to exercise their claim. First, they can base their claim on Art. 531 of 
the Commercial Code and proceed against managers or persons that participated 
in the management of the company without the need to extend bankruptcy 
proceeding of the company to the manager. This is because the creditors shall 
not have the burden of proving that the manager(s) were not diligent or careful 
in their administration of the company since the law makes a presumption of 
                                                                                                            
Uniform Act Organizing Collective Proceedings for Wiping off Debts, Art. 194.  
94 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 968 cum. 1155.  
95 Seifu Tekle Mariam, supra note 3, p.24. 
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non-diligence. Moreover, the three conditions of Art. 1160 discussed above 
need not be proved by the creditor in bankruptcy. For creditors of private limited 
company this is a preferable action, if the manager could be able to meet the 
claim. Secondly, if it is not possible to recover the debts from managers 
according to Article 531, they may require the court to extend the bankruptcy to 
such persons as per Article 1160(1) of the Commercial Code upon the burden of 
proving the conditions required by law.  
4.1.2. Piercing the corporate veil in case of failure of directors to 
discharge duties diligently 
Director(s) are responsible for exercising the duties imposed on them by law, 
the memorandum and articles of association or resolution of the meetings of 
shareholders, with the care due from an agent.96 Accordingly, director(s) will be 
held liable to the company’s creditors where they fail to preserve intact the 
company’s assets and consequently the assets become insufficient to meet 
liabilities.  
According to Article 366 of the Commercial Code, the liability of director(s) 
is a fault-based liability.  In effect, they are liable only upon failure to preserve 
the assets of the company intact thereby causing the insufficiency of its assets to 
meet its debts. Where the company’s assets are insufficient to satisfy the claims 
of the creditors, the latter may proceed against the director(s) for the payment of 
their unsatisfied claims. When the company’s assets are shown to be 
insufficient, the directors are presumed to have failed to keep the company’s 
assets intact. The only way out for the directors is to show that they have acted 
with due care and diligence.  They would not be liable to third parties if they 
could show to the satisfaction of the court that they have carried out their duty 
diligently and carefully.97 The presumption of the law for failure of directors to 
carry out their duty, in case where the assets of the company becomes 
insufficient to satisfy the claims of creditors, shifts the burden of proof to the 
directors themselves. Moreover, the resolution of the general meeting not to 
institute proceedings against the directors would not relieve the delinquent 
director(s) from personal liability as a consequence of a wrongful act.98 
Contrary to the argument of Seifu Tekle Mariam who restricts the application 
of Article 366 of the Commercial Code to cases when the company is declared 
bankrupt, the author of this article argues that the proper application of Article 
366 applies even before the judicial declaration of bankruptcy. If Article 366 
only applies to companies that are judicially declared bankrupt, it would be 
                                           
96 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 364(1).  
97 Ibid, Art. 364 (5). 
98 Ibid,, Art. 366 (3). 
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redundant and serves no purpose as the liabilities of directors in case of 
bankruptcy are already addressed by Article 1160 (1) of the Commercial Code, 
as discussed above.  
For a company to be bankrupt, two cumulative conditions should be satisfied. 
These are suspension of payment99 and declaration of bankruptcy.100 Factual 
bankruptcy does not make a company bankrupt. In other words, where no 
judgment in bankruptcy is given, bankruptcy shall not result from mere 
suspension of payments.101 
The requirements for the personal liability of director(s), according to Article 
366 of the Commercial Code, are their failure to preserve the company’s assets 
intact and the resultant insufficiency of the company’s assets to meet its 
liabilities. Only one of the conditions for bankruptcy (i.e. suspension of payment 
and not judgment of bankruptcy) is thus required to make director(s) liable for 
the debts of a company under this legal provision. Therefore, this clearly 
amplifies the fact that Article 366 of the Commercial Code shall apply to make 
director(s) liable for the debts of a company without requiring the company to 
be declared bankrupt. It is also to be noted that this provision shall à fortiori 
apply in case of bankruptcy as well. Therefore, this is one of the statutory 
stipulations that render director(s) and manager(s) liable for the debts 
(liabilities) of the company on the ground of “failure to discharge duties 
diligently” under Ethiopian law. 
4.1.3. Piercing the corporate veil upon reduction of members below 
the legal minimum 
A share company shall not have less than five members and it is always 
commercial in form irrespective of its objects.102  Failure to maintain this 
minimum required number of members may lead to the dissolution of the 
company and liability of members for the debts of a company. In this regard, 
Article 311 of the Commercial Code states that “no company shall remain in 
business for more than six months after the number of members is reduced to 
less than five.” The creditors or even the members may make an application, to 
the court, to order the winding-up of a company if the members are less than 
five or the company does not possess the prescribed organs. Creditors may make 
the remaining members, who are aware of such reduction, liable for their claims 
                                           
99 Ibid, Art. 971. Suspension of payment may result from any fact, act or document 
showing that the debtor is no longer able to meet the commitments related to his 
commercial activities. 
100 Ibid,, Art. 969.  
101 Ibid, Art. 970 (1). 
102 Ibid, Art. 10(2). 
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as Article 311 of the commercial code states that: “… every member aware of 
such reduction [of members] shall be personally liable for the debts contracted 
thereafter.” 
Therefore, creditors can make the remaining members, who are cognizant of 
such reduction, liable for the debts of a company incurred after six months from 
the reduction of members. The liability of the remaining members is not related 
to the debts incurred before the happening of the reduction of the members, but 
for the debts incurred within six months from the reduction of the members. The 
six month period is regarded as a period of “grace” during which the remaining 
members of a company may avoid personal liability by either reorganizing the 
company or by filing a petition for the winding-up of a company. This provision 
is based on the assumption that the danger of abuse of the principle of separate 
legal personality tends to be greater where the company is controlled by a few 
or, even worse, by a single person.103 This is therefore, a clear ground of 
piercing the corporate veil under Ethiopian law. 
Similarly, a private limited company shall not have less than two and more 
than fifty members and is always commercial in form.104  If the number of 
members goes below two, the court may order the dissolution of the company 
upon the application of the creditors or a member after giving reasonable time 
for the company to make arrangements to comply with the law.105 The only 
remedy available to creditors is requiring the dissolution of a company. Unlike 
share companies where creditors can make the remaining members personally 
liable, there is no similar provision regarding private limited companies. Since 
the purpose of both provisions seems similar – i.e. protection of creditors’ 
interest – there is no valid reason for the legislator not to give similar protection 
for creditors of private limited companies. Therefore, the law has to be modified 
to include such provisions or the courts should render justice by extending the 
provision provided for share companies through purposive interpretation rather 
than rigid literal reading. 
4.1.4. Piercing the corporate veil in group companies 
The term group companies (also known as related companies) refers to 
companies related through the ownership of shares, organization of management 
or through indirect mechanisms that entail control or influence of one company 
                                           
103 Seyoum Yohanness, supra note 83, p.103. 
104 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 510(2). 
105 Ibid, Art. 511.   
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by the other.106 These related companies may be classified as vertically related 
(parent-subsidiary)107 companies and horizontally related (sister)108 companies. 
If related companies are formed for abusive purposes, a parent company 
may, for instance, use its controlling power in the subsidiary company and resort 
to misconduct and endanger various interests. For example, minority 
shareholders may have little control as a result of which they are unable to prove 
the fraud committed by the parent company due to high cost of litigation and 
unequal bargaining power with the parent company.109 Similarly, the creditors 
of the subsidiary may be highly affected due to the reduction in the solvency of 
the subsidiary company which could be caused by the parent company’s 
misconduct.110  Such misconduct by the parent company which affects creditors 
is committed under the guise of the principle of separate personality and limited 
liability. Although the parent company is a member of the subsidiary, both are 
distinct entities at law and the liabilities of the parent company are limited to its 
own capital investment. This may be misused as a shield against the creditors of 
the subsidiaries who are prohibited from pursuing their claims from the parent 
company whenever the subsidiary fails to meet its liabilities. 
Under such circumstances, the laws of different countries protect the interests 
of the subsidiary company’s creditors and lift the corporate veil, either by virtue 
of statutory provisions or through judicial decisions on the ground of the single 
economic entity theory or on the basis of agency. This entitles the subsidiary’s 
creditors to proceed against the parent company. 
In Ethiopia, the Commercial Code enables a subsidiary company to proceed 
against a parent company that acts as its director, pursuant to the right given to 
bodies corporate to act as directors of a company.111 Likewise, creditors of a 
                                           
106 Bruck Kefyalew, supra note 30, p.31. 
107 Ibid, p.35. Vertically related companies are companies related because one company 
holds majority shares (when a company owning more than 50% of the voting shares) 
in the other company or exerts substantial control on the management of the 
company. 
108 Ibid, p.36. Horizontally related companies, also called ‘affiliated companies’, 
‘sibling companies’ or ‘sister companies’ exist when there are two or more 
companies, which have common share holders who are natural persons and who 
own the whole of these companies as between themselves. These types of companies 
are created by owners who wish to attain a certain business goal by using multiple 
companies which function as a single enterprise. 
109 Ibid, p. 52. 
110 Belayneh Ketsela (2006), The need for the regulation of Groups of companies 
(parent-Subsidiary companies) in Ethiopia, Senior thesis, faculty of Law, Addis 
Ababa University, (unpublished), p.32. 
111 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 347 (4), 364 (1), cum. 366.  
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subsidiary can proceed against the parent company acting as a director of their 
debtor (i.e. the subsidiary) if it fails to perform its duties imposed by law, the 
memorandum or resolution of meetings and where this causes the insufficiency 
of the assets of the subsidiary.112  This also applies during bankruptcy of the 
subsidiary by virtue of Article 1160 of the Commercial Code. In such situations, 
the separate legal personality and limited liability of the parent company may be 
disregarded and it may be held liable beyond the contribution it has made in the 
subsidiary company. In this regard, it must be noted that it is only the veil of the 
subsidiary company which is pierced; and only the parent company, as the 
shareholder of the subsidiary company, is held liable. Hence, this ground of 
piercing is known as partial piercing as the shareholders of the parent company 
are still shielded by the veil of the parent company.  
These remedies are available against a director parent company (i.e. when a 
parent company is chosen as a director of the subsidiary company as per Article 
347(4) of the Commercial Code). Therefore, there are no other extensive 
(sufficient) statutory grounds of piercing in case of parent-subsidiary companies 
so as to make the parent company liable for the debts of the subsidiary unless 
the parent company is appointed as a director of the subsidiary under Ethiopian 
law. The law should indeed consider other grounds of piercing the corporate veil 
in corporate groups (parent-subsidiary companies) to avoid the abusive 
behaviors of the parent company and to effectively protect the minority 
shareholders and creditors of the subsidiary company.  
The other avenue of abuse of limited liability may arise when shareholders 
split a company into various distinct business entities and form sister companies 
with the hope of minimizing the assets that will be available to the creditors of a 
company.113 Shareholders may also enter into new related business by 
incorporating a new business entity.114  
Despite the possibility of such abusive conducts, Ethiopian law does not 
provide clear provisions as a ground for piercing the corporate veil of sister 
companies to make one liable for the debts of the other sister company. Hence, 
the legislator should promulgate adequate laws which provide sufficient 
statutory grounds to pierce the corporate veil of the sister companies. Under a 
common law system, judges could have easily played a proactive role in the 
interest of justice to pierce the veil by considering them as a single economic 
entity provided that abusive activities exist between the sister companies. 
 
                                           
112 Ibid, Art. 366(1).  
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4.1.5. Piercing the corporate veil in case of trade restraint  
The other ground which may call for the application of the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil in Ethiopia is when a person uses the corporate entity to evade 
his obligations, be it legal or contractual. If the underlying motive for the 
formation of a company is to enable the company’s human constituent(s) to 
avoid their pre-existing obligation with a third party, it will give a room for 
piercing the corporate veil.  
To this end, we can find some provisions in the Commercial Code that 
impose restrictive obligations on individuals. Article 158(1) of the Commercial 
Code provides that “the seller of business shall refrain from doing any act of 
competition likely to injure the buyer for a period of five years following the 
date of sale of the business. In particular, he may not carry on, in the vicinity of 
the business he sold, a trade similar to a trade carried on by the buyer.” Thus, if 
a seller of a business establishes a closely held company or other company in 
which he holds a majority of shares and where this company is engaged in a 
competitive business which is likely to injure the buyer in the vicinity of the 
business he sold, the court should consider the established company as a device 
to evade his restrictive legal obligations. 
The same applies in case of evasion of contractual obligations. An obligation 
validly entered into, by which one party binds him/herself not to establish a 
competitive business in a defined area, cannot evade the obligation by the 
formation of a company which is intended to run the business he/she is 
prohibited to establish. Article 30(2) of the Commercial Code provides that “a 
commercial employee and a trader may provide, in their contract of 
employment, a restrictive clause prohibiting the commercial employee from 
carrying on private trade (i.e. from entering into competitive business with his 
employer or engage in any way whatsoever in undertaking which would 
compete with the employer) upon the expiry of a contract of employment.”115 
Thus, if a commercial employee establishes a closely held company or other 
                                           
115 The contractual restriction imposed upon the employee is valid if and only if the 
work given to the employee enables him to meet the clients of the employer or enter 
into the secrets of his business. (Art. 2589 of the Civil Code). In other words, the 
restrictive agreement is valid if it is necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interests of the employer. The restrictive agreement should not impede, in an 
inequitable manner, the economic future of the employee. To this end, the restrictive 
agreement should be limited as to time, place and business forbidden to the 
employee. (Art. 2590 of the Civil Code of Ethiopia). Moreover, the employer may 
not avail himself of such restrictive provision where he has cancelled the contract of 
employment or refuse to renew it without good cause or if it is proved that the 
employer has no material interest in its maintenance. (Art. 2592 of the Civil Code of 
Ethiopia).   
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company in which he holds the majority of shares of a company engaged in a 
competitive business with his former employer, the court should consider the 
established company as a device to evade his restrictive contractual obligations. 
Therefore, a person should not be allowed to evade his obligations, legal or 
contractual, by forming a company in which he holds a great majority of the 
shares or establishing a closely held share company. If he establishes a company 
in contravention of the restrictive obligation imposed upon him by law or by 
agreement, the court may recognize the existence of the corporate entity but 
may nevertheless pierce the corporate veil to prevent him from escaping a 
liability that otherwise would have been enforceable had the individual 
concerned not sought to hide behind the company’s separate legal status. Such 
companies, as described above in relation with French law, should be regarded 
as a ‘sham’ or ‘façade’ that are utilized to evade obligations and these facts 
ought to justify veil piercing. 
4.2. The judicial recognition of piercing the corporate veil 
in Ethiopia 
This section of the article tries to assess whether the Ethiopian courts recognize 
and apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and if so, how they apply it. 
Selamu Bekele argues that Ethiopian courts/tribunals cannot pierce the 
corporate veil and states: “in Ethiopia the law which has given legal personality 
to commercial companies has itself made enough holes in the veil of the legal 
personality so that more piercing seems unworthy of effort.”116 He further 
contends that: 
[a]ccording to the Ethiopian … approach, the law itself has raised the 
mask to a certain extent, raising beyond which appears to be contrary to a 
policy of a codified legal system whose aim is to ascertain the law in a 
code form and give little opportunity for the exercise of a judges’ 
discretion. The wall of legal personality in Ethiopian law is built in such a 
manner that it is neither too strong nor too weak. If a judge wants to dig a 
hole through such a wall he may safely do so in regard as to what breach 
of duties by a director or manager of a company means. Even there, the 
law has set a legal standard. Finding whether a director has breached his 
duty, by not having due care or diligence or by not keeping the company’s 
assets intact, is a matter of fact. As such it could not have been defined 
                                           
116 Selamu Bekele(1966), Private commercial companies under Ethiopian law: their 
legal and practical significance, Senior Thesis, Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I 
University, (unpublished), p. 22.  
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any narrower as a legal principle. But that is far from letting the judge 
have complete discretion to collapse the wall from its foundation.117 
Selamu Bekele concludes that a judge need not peep through or beyond the wall 
to look at the persons who may hide behind it to the prejudice of creditors. In 
Selamu’s opinion, the role of the judge is only to look through the openings 
built by the legislator and this can be achieved only by ascertaining whether a 
director has breached his duty, by not having due care or diligence or by not 
keeping the company’s assets intact. In effect, Selamu argues that the only 
statutory ground of piercing is failure of a director to act diligently and to keep 
the company’s assets intact.  
The author of this article disagrees with Selamu’s view.  Although Ethiopia 
does not belong to the common law legal system, its company law is influenced 
both by the common law and civil law legal systems.  In the legislative 
background document, the drafter of Commercial Code of Ethiopia noted that 
“without taking into account the so called preference to be given to this or that 
model in the continental or Anglo American Legal system, I have always in 
mind the interest of Ethiopia and I have selected the solutions which I believe to 
be the best no matter where they come from …”118 
Even if Ethiopia belongs to the civil law legal system, it does not mean that 
the judges are limited and solely bound by the legal provisions of the Codes. 
There can be instances where the judges may have discretion to be inquisitive 
and flexible in the interest of justice and this reality is clear if we look at the role 
of judges in the court proceedings as provided in the Civil Procedure Code.119 
Hirut Mellese, former Federal Supreme Court Judge,120 states that the door is 
not completely closed for the exercise of judicial piercing in Ethiopia at least 
through a broad interpretation of the available statutory holes in a way that 
serves justice without, however, opening a room for judicial abuse. The 
following decisions of courts and /or administrative tribunals substantiate this 
position.  
Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. v. The Inland Revenue Department (1965) is the first 
case that involved the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in Ethiopia and it 
appeared few years after the enactment of the Commercial Code. The case was 
                                           
117 Ibid, pp. 22. 
118 Winiship P. (1972), (Editor and Translator), Background Document of Ethiopian 
Commercial Code of 1960, Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I University, (Addis 
Ababa: Artistic Printers), p. 61. 
119 Interview with Ato Asrat Eshetu, Assistant judge at the Federal High Court, 
conducted on May 17, 2011. 
120 Interview with W/ro. Hirut Melesse, former Federal Supreme Court Judge, 
conducted in may 25/2011. 
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first seen by the Tax Appeal Commission (an administrative tribunal), as 
Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. v. The Inland Revenue Department, File No. 1130/56, 
on appeal against the income tax assessment by the Inland Revenue Department 
which treated the appellant company and a related company (Mosvold Wood 
Works Ltd.) as single entity for income tax purposes.121 The argument of the 
appellant was that the two companies (i.e. Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. and Mosvold 
Wood Works Ltd.) are separate and distinct legal entities validly formed by 
separate Memorandum of Association and registered in the Commercial 
Register; that they have different business purposes since one is engaged in 
commercial activities while the other is engaged in  manufacturing (industry); 
that there is no law enabling the revenue department to consider the two entities 
as if one is the main office and the other a branch; and that they are separately 
registered in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The appellant argued that, 
the Inland Revenue Department erred in considering them as a single entity for 
income tax purposes.122 
The counsel for the Inland Revenue Department, on his part, replied that the 
two companies are registered separately for tax avoidance purposes; that their 
activities are related and Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. gets all the benefits, and 
Mosvold wood works is owned exclusively by Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. and its 
shareholders. Hence, he argued that their income must not be treated separately 
and the consolidation of the book of accounts of the two entities is proper.123 
The Tax Appeal Commission, after hearing the arguments of both parties, 
held that the two companies should be treated as a single entity for tax purposes. 
The tribunal reasoned that, even if the two companies were registered 
separately, the shareholders in the first company are exclusively the founders of 
the second company; that the two companies undertake sale transactions jointly 
and also share the profits, and it appears that the second company was formed in 
order to reduce the income tax liability of the enterprises as a whole. Therefore, 
the Commission, by majority vote, decided that the incomes of the two 
companies shall have to be consolidated for purposes of levying the income tax 
notwithstanding the fact that they are organized as separate companies under the 
Commercial Code.124 The decision of the Tax Appeal Commission was similar 
                                           
121 In principle, every member of a group companies is with its distinct personality 
which is followed by limited liability. Thus, in tax laws, each member of a group 
bears its own tax burdens on the basis of all the profits it has earned, irrespective of 
the loss and profits the other group may have incurred. 
122  Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. V. The Inland Revenue Department (Tax appeal 
Commission, 1965), Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 122. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid, p. 123. 
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to the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil on the ground of 
establishing a single economic entity. 
Although the Tax Appeal Commission did not invoke Article 451(1) of the 
Commercial Code, the provision states that “[w]here a company is a holding 
company, the accounts of its subsidiaries shall be submitted to the annual 
general meeting at the same time and in the same manner as its own 
accounts”.125 Article 451(2) further provides that “[a] consolidated balance sheet 
and profit and loss account shall be prepared in respect of the holding company 
and its subsidiaries”.126 The only exceptions to this rule are where the directors 
believe that “the drawing up of such balance sheet would be impractical or too 
onerous, or of little concern to the shareholders on account of the small financial 
interests involved”;127 or “where the directors of a holding company are of 
opinion that the drawing up of such balance sheet could prejudice the company 
or its subsidiaries, or that the company and its shareholders carry out business of 
such a differing nature that they may not reasonably be deemed to form a single 
enterprise”, and if this opinion is approved by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.128 As the facts of the case shows, the two companies (i.e. Mosvold 
(Ethiopia) Ltd. and Mosvold Wood Works Ltd.) are engaged in activities of 
related nature. The case shows that companies established with a view of 
evading or minimizing tax may be considered (by courts and tribunals) as a 
single entity for tax purpose,129 as an exception to the rule of distinct legal 
personality. 
                                           
125 Commercial Code, supra note 17, Art. 451(1). 
126 Ibid, Art. 451(2). 
127 Ibid, Art. 451(3). 
128 Ibid, Art. 451(4). 
129 Some commentators argue that treating a group as a single entity is more 
advantageous for that group in case of tax. They argue that if a group is 
considered as a single entity, the losses that the other group members have 
incurred will be deducted from the profits of one group member whenever 
taxable profits are calculated which ultimately reduces the taxable income. 
Moreover, it has also the advantage of avoiding tax charges on gains from 
intra-group transactions. For example, if one group member acquires certain 
assets from another group member, the gains of the seller company do not 
trigger a tax charge as the transaction is considered to be undertaken within a 
single entity. (See Belayneh Ketsela, the need for the regulation of group 
Companies in Ethiopia, pp.21-22 cited above, note 110). However, the above 
argument will have merit only when the group of companies incurs losses. But, 
if the groups of companies are profitable, the sum of profits will be higher 
thereby increasing the tax liability.  
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However, an appeal was lodged to the High Court against the decision of the 
Tax Appeal Commission (Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. v. The Inland Revenue 
Department, file No.820/58),130 The High Court reversed the decision of the Tax 
Appeal Commission arguing that companies organized separately under the 
Commercial Code are to be treated as separate entities for tax purposes.  It 
further argued that the intention of the legislator is not to hold such companies 
as one legal entity for tax purposes. If the contrary was the intention of the 
legislator, it would have addressed such cases in the tax law itself.131 
The High Court simply decided that the two companies, registered separately 
in the Commercial Register, are two distinct bodies and entities without further 
inquiring into other circumstances to see whether Mosvold Wood Works was, in 
fact, a subsidiary established for tax avoidance or other improper purposes. In 
particular, the shareholding in the two companies must have been considered. 
The shareholders in Mosvold Wood Works were four. Out of the 300 shares 294 
of them were held by the appellant, Mosvold Company. The remaining six 
shares were equally held by three persons who were also shareholders in the 
appellant company.132 The Court should have also considered how the business 
of the Mosvold Wood works was being conducted. That is, the fact that both 
companies undertake related activities in which the appellant was engaged in 
furniture selling business, and that the second company provided it with the 
necessary woodwork products. Hence, the decision of the court reversing the 
decision of the Tax Appeal Commission failed to consider these realities. 
A recent case related to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, Feven 
Zemen et al v. Askalukan Trading PLC and Others133 involved 42 persons134 as 
plaintiffs while the defendants are Askalukan Trading PLC, Ato Girmaye 
G/Michael (A director for the PLC), W/ro. Mena Terefe (A manager for the 
PLC), and Ato Girma Bekele (An accountant for the PLC). Askalukan Trading 
PLC made announcements through different Media (newspapers, radio, TV, 
notices etc.) that it is the only organization that arranges a travel to South Africa 
for the 2010 World Cup events. Hence, the plaintiffs concluded a contract with 
the Askalukan Trading PLC in which the company undertook to arrange travel 
                                           
130 Mosvold (Ethiopia) Ltd. v. The Inland Revenue Department (High court, 1967), 
J.Eth. L., Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 104. 
131 Ibid, p.105. 
132 Seifu Tekle Mariam, supra note 3, p.28. 
133 W/rt. Feven Zemen and Others v. Askaluka Trading PLC and Others, (Federal High 
court, Civil File No. 96230, 2003 E.C), Unpublished.  
134 It is in this file No. 96230 that the plaintiffs are only 42. The defendants are sued by 
other persons in many separate civil files. The defendants are also charged under a 
separate criminal case. However, this civil file is chosen for the purpose of the 
discussion on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.  
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to South Africa to enable them attend the 2010 World Cup events. To this end, 
the PLC collected Birr 37,582.65 from each of the 40 plaintiffs, Birr 47,632.06 
and Birr 48,333.67 from two plaintiffs whose travel tickets were expected to be 
used with a child.  The total amount of Birr 1,599,217.06 was collected from the 
42 plaintiffs. However, the company was unable to discharge its duties or return 
the money to the plaintiffs.135 
Even though summons was sent to the defendants to appear on the date fixed 
for the hearing, they were not able to appear except for the fourth defendant 
(Ato Girma Bekele). The court then, ruled to hear the case in their absence (ex 
parte).  The fourth defendant, at the hearing, argued that he is a mere employee 
(an accountant) of the company and was not involved in the affairs of 
management. He further argued that he should not be responsible because the 
company has its own legal personality and the contract was concluded between 
the plaintiffs and the company itself.136 After hearing his oral argument and the 
evidence presented to it, the Court dismissed the claims against the fourth 
defendant on the ground that he is a mere employee of the PLC and stated that 
the fourth defendant has no contractual relationship with the plaintiffs and that 
he is neither a member nor a director or manager of the PLC.137 However, the 
court decided that the company (Askalukan PLC), the director (Ato Girmay 
G/Michael), and the manager (W/ro. Mena Terefe) are jointly and severally 
liable for the claims of the plaintiffs and shall pay the debt together with legal 
interest rate (i.e. 9% per annum).138  
The High Court stated that the director and manager did such illegal or 
fraudulent activities on the assumption that they will not be personally 
responsible for any act of the company as the latter has its own separate legal 
personality and that they were shielded by the advantage of limited liability.139 
However, the court reasoned that, the limited liability advantage exists only if 
the member(s), director, and manager use the company for lawful purposes. It 
then underlined that there is no reason why the liability of the company cannot 
be extended (shifted) to the director and manager if they employ it for 
fraudulent or illegal purposes.140 
                                           
135 The statement of claim of the plaintiffs prepared and submitted to the Federal High 
Court in June 28/2002 E.C. 
136 W/rt. Feven Zemen and Others v. Askaluka Trading PLC and Others, supra note 
133, p. 3. 
137 Ibid, the decision part, p. 6. 
138 Ibid.   
139 Ibid,  p. 5 
140 Ibid.  
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In the case at hand, Askalukan Trading Private Limited Company was 
formed by two persons, who are spouses and who are exclusive shareholders at 
the same time having the functions of director and manager of the company. 
Their personal assets and the assets of the company are thus susceptible to be 
intermingled which makes it very easy to shift the assets of the company to their 
own personal benefits. 
Therefore, the Federal High Court rightly pierced the corporate veil of the 
Askalukan Trading PLC and decided the members, who were the director and 
manager of the company as well, jointly and severally liable with the PLC for 
the claims of the creditors. The Court observed that the limited liability 
advantage shall not apply if the members, director (s) and manager (s) use a 
company for fraudulent purposes, in which case the company is regarded as a 
device or legal façade. 
Needless-to-say, the two cases highlighted above do not fully represent the 
jurisprudence of Ethiopian courts.  Yet, they offer examples and thresholds 
regarding what can be done by Ethiopian courts in the implementation of the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, a role which requires not only the literal 
interpretation of the statutory provisions, but also a wider flexible and purposive 
interpretation commensurate with the magnitude of abuse that can unfold.  
Conclusion 
The legal personality of companies (as separate and distinct from its 
shareholders) and limited liability are recognized under Ethiopian law thereby 
rendering shareholders liable only to the extent of their shareholdings as stated 
under Articles 304 and 510 of the Commercial Code. This veil is a partition or 
curtain between the company and its members and is regarded as a privilege for 
the shareholders as it covers them in the corporate veil and keeps them from the 
reach of outsiders (creditors). However, such privilege of limited liability may 
not always exist in certain circumstances as discussed in the preceding sections 
owing to the possibility of piercing the veil of a company. 
Although there is no consistent guiding principle to govern the circumstances 
in which a court should pierce the corporate veil, common law courts cite some 
basic grounds which include the fraud exception, the establishment of a single 
economic entity, the ground of agency and the interest of justice. Likewise, 
there are some grounds of statutory and judicial piercing in the French legal 
system. 
 The Commercial Code of Ethiopia has also provided some clear statutory 
solutions to the most important aspects of piercing the corporate veil. However, 
the statutory grounds of piercing the corporate veil under Ethiopian law, as 
highlighted above, are limited. Since Ethiopia is on the eve of enacting a new 
Commercial Code, the legislative reform should thus consider this problem and 
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provide additional grounds for piercing the corporate veil. Particularly, as the 
new (draft) Commercial Code recognizes and introduces a one man company 
into the Ethiopian legal system, it is necessary to provide sufficient rules that 
can regulate the possible abuses of the sole owner. 
Moreover, the preceding sections have highlighted other possible (ought to 
be) grounds for piercing the corporate veil in Ethiopia on top of the clearly 
provided statutory grounds. These possible grounds include: reduction of 
members of a private limited company below the required legal minimum, the 
case of trade restraint where a person establishes a company to evade 
obligations, legal or contractual, and the case of sister companies if there is no 
substantive separation as between themselves.  
Ethiopian Courts are not proactive enough in applying the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil although some attempts are made to that effect, as 
shown above. This seems to be attributable to the perception that Ethiopia is 
following a codified legal system and the only role of the judges is to ascertain 
the law as embodied in the Codes.  However, the Ethiopian company law is 
influenced by both the common and civil law legal systems. Moreover, 
following a civil law legal system does not necessarily mean that the judges are 
limited and solely bound by the legal provision of the Code. Thus they have the 
discretion to be inquisitive and flexible in the interest of justice whenever there 
are gaps in the law that are conducive to business malpractice and abuse in the 
guise of the corporate veil.  In particular, the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court is expected to play a vital role in this regard as it is empowered 
to give decisions on cases which have a fundamental error of law and which 
ultimately serve as a precedent with regard to the interpretation of similar legal 












              
